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ABSTRACT  
The Enterprise Information System (EIS) Value Assurance Framework (VAF) is 
an Information Technology (IT) governance model based on commercial best 
practice adapted to specific DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) acquisition 
policy requirements.  VAF expands and abstracts traditional DoD “Availability” 
metrics such as “Operational Availability” Ao to develop objective time-based Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) appropriate for software-intensive systems of 
systems.  In particular VAF addresses both the DoD “Sustainment KPP” (S-KPP) 
and the “Net-Ready KPP” (NR-KPP).  Hence, VAF provides an engineering 
assurance model for developing systems that deliver sustainable information 
superiority.  In the VAF construct, the NR-KPP correlates measurable 
improvement in “Information Processing Efficiency” (IPE) to measurable 
improvement in traditional operational effect metrics such as Probability of Kill 
(Pk).  In addition to that focus on operational efficiency, VAF recognizes that 
sustainment of modern IT systems requires process-level metrics that enforce 
speed-to-capability requirements.  Hence VAF S-KPPs specify both threshold 
and objective speed-to-capability requirements commensurate with “Moore’s 
Law.”  To achieve aggressive speed-to-capability, the VAF S-KPPs emphasize 
re-use of pre-certified COTS and GOTS components.  The VAF addresses both 
of these types of KPPs through a recommended iterative process, consisting of 
10 steps. Applying this process to a notional coalition counter-insurgency mission 
thread demonstrates its viability.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Enterprise Information System (EIS) Value Assurance Framework (VAF) is 
an Information Technology (IT) governance model based on commercial best 
practice adapted to specific DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) acquisition 
policy requirements.  VAF expands and abstracts traditional DoD “Availability” 
metrics such as “Operational Availability” Ao to develop objective time-based Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) appropriate for software-intensive systems of 
systems.  In particular VAF addresses both the DoD “Sustainment KPP” (S-KPP) 
and the “Net-Ready KPP” (NR-KPP).  Hence, VAF provides an engineering 
assurance model for developing systems that deliver sustainable information 
superiority.  In the VAF construct, the NR-KPP correlates measurable 
improvement in “Information Processing Efficiency” (IPE) to measurable 
improvement in traditional operational effect metrics such as Probability of Kill 
(Pk).  In addition to that focus on operational efficiency, VAF recognizes that 
sustainment of modern IT systems requires process-level metrics that enforce 
speed-to-capability requirements.  Hence VAF S-KPPs specify both threshold 
and objective speed-to-capability requirements commensurate with “Moore’s 
Law.”  To achieve aggressive speed-to-capability, the VAF S-KPPs emphasize 
re-use of pre-certified COTS and GOTS components.  The VAF addresses both 
of these types of KPPs through a recommended iterative process, consisting of 
the following 10 steps::  
 
1. Establish a goal for a threshold-level improvement in operational 
performance based on ability to deliver within targeted short 
deployment time window.    
2. Analyze the as-is information solution architecture including DOTMLTF.  
3. Using that analysis, parametrically model the as-is Information IPE 
accordingly and calculate the current parameter values. 
4. Model how operational performance depends upon IPE 
5. Identify the incremental IPE improvement required to achieve the goal 
of threshold improvement in operational performance  
6. Calculate the associated threshold target NR-KPP “Information Value 
Availability” (Aiv) 
7. Analyze options, define constraints, and design an appropriate solution 
architecture 
8. Rapidly deliver incremental improvement 
9. Test and certify the improved system against the goal NR-KPP Aiv  to 
verify that the threshold improvement has been attained 
10. Iterate the process from step 1. 
 
Applying this process to a notional coalition counter-insurgency mission thread 
demonstrates its viability. I illustrate that in paragraph 4.  
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I. INFORMATION VALUE-BASED SUSTAINMENT KPP AND 
NET-READY KPP LINKAGE 
 
The Enterprise Information System (EIS) Value Assurance Framework (VAF) is 
an IT acquisition governance model.  VAF is based on modern commercial best 
practice and government best practice.  It includes a suite of metrics derived from 
policy and guidance set forth in Defense directives such as references (a)-(d).  
VAF provides an implementation methodology for the recommendations of the 
Defense Science Board per reference (e).  
 
The VAF recognizes that two of the mandatory KPPs described in reference (a) 
must be tightly coupled.  These KPPs are the “Sustainment” KPP (S-KPP) and 
the “Net-Ready” KPP (NR-KPP).   
 
Per reference (a), programs will typically field capability at threshold values of 
KPPs.  They will employ a sustainment strategy to iterate toward eventually 
achieving objective values of KPPs.  The Sustainment KPP is the formally 
mandated assurance model for achieving this continuous improvement through a 
series of above-threshold changes.   
 
Per references (a)-(d), the NR-KPP objectively defines improvements in 
operational effectiveness enabled by information exchanges across EIS and 
National Security Systems (NSS).  Certainly, any software-intensive IT system -- 
let alone any system tied to military operational effectiveness -- needs a 
sustainment model that assures continuous improvement throughout its lifetime.   
Reference (e) emphasizes this point and identifies speed-to-capability as 
arguably the greatest risk factor associated with DoD IT system acquisition.  
 
Hence, a program’s Sustainment KPP must be linked to its NR-KPP.  In other 
words, the S-KPP must assure continued improvement in operational 
effectiveness enabled by effective information exchanges across IT and NSS 
systems.    
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II. INFORMATION VALUE-BASED NET-READY KPP 
FORMULATION  
Per references (a) – (d), the NR-KPP has two parts: 
 
1. Testable performance targets re mission effectiveness 
2. Testable performance targets re information exchanges  
 
 
Hence, the VAF factors NR-KPP into two parts:  
 
1. Delivered Information Value (DIV) 
2. Information Processing Efficiency (IPE)   
 
such that:  
 
Aiv = IPE x DIV 
IPE = (VB ÷TB) x WP 
DIV = P1 X P2 X ….X Pn 
 
where:  
 
Aiv = Information Value Availability  
IPE = Information Processing Efficiency 
 VB = Valued Bits Processed 
 TB = Total Bits Processed  
 WP = Perishability factor, i.e. describes time window of utility  
  
DIV = Delivered Information Value  
• P1, ... , Pn = Measured or target scores re operational 
performance, e.g., Probability of Kill, Planning Cycle Time, 
Logistics Latency, etc.  
 
Successful application of this methodology requires what is known in the IT 
industry as a “Beta” community.   Beta communities are usually tech-savvy 
customers who are eager to work with early versions of new capability to help 
providers address their needs.  The VAF approach adapts the concept of 
“Communities of Interest” (COI) identified in DoD GIG policy for this purpose.  In 
the VAF construct COIs become hands-on beta development communities.  
These Beta COIs must include both members of the appropriate government 
operational community as well as relevant COTS developers.  This approach 
both leverages COTS economy of scale and nudges COTS development in 
directions useful to the government.   Programs can write contracts that require 
and enforce such beta community creation and involvement. 
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The VAF develops IPE in context with DIV.  IPE is a measure of “semantic 
interoperability”, i.e. how easily and effectively disparate data from disparate 
sources on network(s) are collected and bundled usefully together. This 
formulation requires that semantic interoperability be designed, built, and tested 
against specific desired outcomes, rather than in the abstract. Specifically, to 
implement semantic interoperability follow the following procedure repeated 
verbatim from the executive summary for the readers’ convenience: 
 
1. Establish a goal for a threshold-level improvement in operational 
performance based on ability to deliver within targeted short 
deployment time window.    
2. Analyze the as-is information solution architecture including 
DOTMLTF.  
3. Using that analysis, parametrically model the as-is Information IPE 
accordingly and calculate the current parameter values. 
4. Model how operational performance depends upon IPE 
5. Identify the incremental IPE improvement required to achieve the 
goal of threshold improvement in operational performance  
6. Calculate the associated threshold target NR-KPP “Information 
Value Availability” (Aiv) 
7. Analyze options, define constraints, and design an appropriate 
solution architecture 
8. Rapidly deliver incremental improvement 
9. Test and certify the improved system against the goal NR-KPP Aiv  
to verify that the threshold improvement has been attained 
10. Iterate the process from step 1. 
 
DIV might be based on a goal level of improvement, e.g., PPk = 1.1 could 
represent a target of 10% improved Probability of Kill (Pk) where “1.0” is the 
normalized index of the current Pk.  
 
IPE is in two parts, a value ratio (VB/TB) and a perishability factor.   
 
The value ratio might formulated as: 
 
VR = AB ÷ TB 
Where: 
 
VR = Value Ratio 
AB = Actionable Bits,  
TB = Total Bits Processed 
 
Notice that in this example “Valued Bits” (VB) are defined as “Actionable Bits” 
(AB).  Actionable Bits are those that stimulate a change to planned actions, either 
to avoid a threat or capitalize on an opportunity.  
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Pk is likely to be highly correlated to the latency of exchange of critical target 
location information. That said, Pk has a practical limit of less than 100%.   
Further, there are latencies associated with some mission thread transactions 
that don’t have anything to do with IPE. Recognizing those limitations to the 
model, we might formulate the perishability factor as a piecewise linear function 
of information exchange latency that closely resembles Pk as a function of the 
same latency as follows:   
 
WP  =1 if L ≤ LO;  
WP = 0 if L > LT;  
WP = (LT - L)/(LT-LO) if LO < L < LT’;  
WP = (WP) T if L’ ≥ L ≤ LT 
 
Where:  
 
WP = Perishability weighting factor as a function of latency 
(WP)T = Perishability weighting function assigned to LT  
L = Information exchange latency  
LO = Objective value of information exchange latency 
LT = Threshold value of information exchange latency 
LT’= Information exchange latency linearly correlated with (WP)T 
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Figure 1: If Probability of Kill is correlated with latency for receipt of critical locating information, 
we can use the correlation to model a perishability weighting function.  LO is the objective and LT is 
the threshold value for information exchange latency.  The availability of information value Aiv 
increases as L decreases and Pk increases.   
 
 
In figure 1, LO and LT correspond to objective and threshold values of Pk.  The 
perishability factor WP remains at its maximum value of 1 if information exchange 
latency is at or better than objective value. As latency increases toward the 
threshold value, WP decreases linearly to the value of assigned to the LT ((WP)T).  
WP, and hence Aiv, goes to zero as latency exceeds the threshold value.   
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III. INFORMATION VALUE-BASED SUSTAINMENT KPP 
FORMULATION  
Per reference (a), the S-KPP and its supporting Key System Attributes (KSAs) 
address three closely related themes: 
 
1. Testable “Material Availability”, i.e. total up time divided by total 
down time per reference (a). 
2. Testable Reliability, i.e. likelihood that system will not fail during a 
specific time interval. Often calculated with Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF).   
3. Testable Ownership Cost, e.g. investment required to maintain 
reliability and to provide for continuing improvement throughout the 
system’s life.    
 
Applying the S- KPP and KSAs to a software-intensive, widely distributed, IT 
system of systems is problematic.  Traditional approaches are designed for 
hardware “boxes” wherein overall system availability, reliability, and ownership 
costs are bounded by the components in the “box” of interest.  The nature of  
“cloud” and “service oriented” network architectures deliberately abstracts the 
detail of component level performance away from the over-all system 
performance.   If a box on a server farm fails, the failure is unlikely to impact 
service availability.  On the other hand, if a demand spike exceeds server farm 
capacity, service availability will suffer even if all components function properly.  
Further, traditional hardware reliability measures and prediction models are not 
suited for software, and “reliability” metrics designed for software are immature.  
 
“Operational Availability” (Ao) is a traditional system-level metric often used as a 
KPP.  Ao addresses run-time availability.  Generally, Ao is “up time” divided by 
“up time” + “down time.”  Specifically, Ao is a model of availability that employs 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), and Mean 
Logistics Delay Time (MLDT), such that:  
 
Ao = MTBF/(MTBF + MTTR + MLDT) 
 
If a part is hard to repair, or takes a long time to obtain, the program manager 
(PM) might decide to provide an on-board spare or even a hot-spare. This will 
probably increase cost, but an alternative approach to develop a more reliable 
component may cost even more and add risk to the schedule. Programs must 
make risk-benefit decisions about how to achieve required run-time performance 
– i.e. a specified value of Ao -- with objective quantification of cost and schedule.  
 
Success with Internet “cloud” and “service oriented” architectures requires a 
system-of-systems perspective.  We need processes to help optimize the myriad 
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options re technology, architecture, IPR, contract vehicles, bundling options, test 
and certification models, etc.    
 
Reference (e) (as well as myriad GAO reports and articles in the press) identifies 
speed-to-capability as a critical failing in the DoD acquisition process.  
Accordingly, VAF addresses this issue by providing metrics that, in addition to 
run-time availability, focus on “availability” over development and delivery 
schedule as well as operation time. That is, VAF introduces process-level metrics 
that focus on build-time efficiency.  The time limiting factor for fielding IT is, at 
least notionally, Moore’s Law.  A new generation of IT evolves every 18 months 
or so.  VAF KPPs acknowledge that fact as a boundary condition, where 
development and delivery together must be at least as fast as the generational 
rate of 18 mos.    
 
The VAF speed-to-capability process metric is called “Net Ready Availability” 
(Anr). Anr is a parameterization of the S-KPP that is analogous to Ao, but treats 
the acquisition process itself as within the boundary of the system of interest. In 
fact, the acquisition process is the part of the overall system responsible for 
delivering continuous improvements.   VAF formulates Anr as follows:   
 
Anr(t) = TD(i)/TCD(c) 
TCD(c) = TD(c)+ TT(c)+ Tc(c) 
 
Where:  
Anr(t) = Net Ready Availability as a function of time 
TD(i)= Initial estimate of development time, a constant 
TCD(c) = Current estimate of capability deployment time, a variable with 
respect to time 
TD(c) = Current estimate of development time, a variable with respect to 
time 
TT(c) = Current estimate of post-development test time, a variable with 
respect to time 
Tc(c) = Current estimate of post-test certification time, a variable with 
respect to time 
 
We can further break out components of TD as follows: 
 
TD = TI +TR + TB + TO  
 
Where:  
 
TI = Invention Time, i.e. time required for creation of new intellectual 
property 
TR = Re-invention Time, i.e. time spent developing capability from scratch 
that already exists on the shelf. 
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TB = Bundling Time, i.e. time expended harvesting capability through the 
build-time interoperability (composability) of Net-Ready components  
TO = Overhead Time, e.g. redundant paperwork 
 
We can add weighting functions to emphasize various best practices such as 
keeping software up to date.  For example: 
 
Wsc = SC/(LOC/BLOC) 
 
Where:  
 
Wsc = Software currency weighting factor.  Wsc increases as programs 
upgrade to current software products and standards and sunset 
legacy code. 
SC = Software Currency, e.g. SC = 1 if code is within one build, patch, 
architecture, standard, etc. of the most current.  SC = 0.1 if 
otherwise. 
LOC = Current count of Lines of Code  
BLOC = Baseline count of Lines of Code 
 
To apply Anr, programs first must recognize that they need to deploy capability 
quickly, say between 12 and 36 months.  Programs then plan to deliver a 
capability portfolio scoped for delivery within that 12- 36 month “Capability 
Deployment Time” (CDT) window.  The scoping might allow for some newly 
“invented” components, but it will mostly require re-using pre-certified COTS or 
GOTS components.  
 
In this model, the acquisition strategy is to incentivize developers to “re-use” 
capability, i.e. bundle, pre-certified off-the-shelf components.  Developers will 
deliver several interim test bundles within the TCD window and adjust their 
schedules after each iteration. Their goal is to deliver as much useful capability 
as possible, but to meet delivery schedule at all costs. If the schedule is at risk, 
i.e. the current estimate of TCD (c) in the denominator increases, the value of Anr 
(t) decreases.  If Anr decreases below some established threshold, the 
developers must adjust to meet the speed-to-capability imperative.  Thus, 
programs avoid fielding obsolete capability.  See Figure 2.  
 
The VAF process seeks to decrease Overhead Time (TO) by reducing redundant 
paperwork.  For example, today there are a hundreds of policy documents 
governing various aspects of government IT acquisition.  VAF-based testers can 
apply semantic technologies to capture the overlapping essential objective 
elements of policy, and to identify and resolve any conflicting policies.  Likewise, 
multiple IT programs have many overlapping basic requirements.  Today those 
programs each capture redundant requirements in expensive paper artifacts.   
Again, testers can use semantic technology to capture requirements in machine -
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readable formats.  This approach allows programs to efficiently re-use pre-
validated requirements artifacts.   
 
Figure 2: Net-Ready Availability” (Anr) is an S-KPP based on speed-to-capability.  Anr compares 
initially scheduled development time (TD) to the current estimate of capability deployment time 
(TCD).  TCD is equal to TD + any additional time required for test (TT)) and certification (TC).   This 
approach considers the capability delivery date to be an aspect of the KPP with established objective 
and threshold values.   A PM’s strategy is to reduce risk to schedule by bundling only small 
increments of newly “invented” specialized capability with existing pre-certified off-the-shelf 
capabilities in frequent spirals.    
 
“Modularity”, “interoperability”, and “portability” are all attributes associated with 
re-usability and bundling. These attributes have historically been difficult to 
measure and enforce.  Historically “chasing standards” has not generally helped.  
Further, DoD has traditionally interpreted the mandate for “interoperability” to 
require new systems to be backward compatible with fielded systems.  The VAF 
approach suggests a paradigm shift.  The new paradigm requires that fielded 
systems maintain “forward interoperability” by staying abreast of emerging 
mainstream commercial technology.  Accordingly, VAF suggests that NR-KPP 
certifiers stop specifying and verifying compliance with universal standards.  
Rather, they should:  
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(1) Work closely with commercial standards’ bodies1 to:  
 
(a) Articulate government objectives and address them 
continuously within the commercial standards development 
process.    
 
(b) Develop a government certification model for the commercial IT 
standards development process based on agreed best practices re 
speed, rigor, and “openness”.  
 
(2) Certify the standard bodies’ processes (per j.1.b) rather than certifying 
each new standard.  That is, certifiers should immediately accept the most 
current standards published by certified standard bodies as “authoritative.”  
 
(3) Certify that programs’ sustainment models can credibly perform 
technology refresh on pace with emergent commercial standards 
throughout system life cycle.   
 
Having designed their NR-KPP/S-KPP-compliant solutions architecture, 
programs will choose specific standards, off-the-shelf products, licenses, and 
contract models accordingly. They will consider options for operating systems, 
middleware, messaging, registry, discovery, etc.  Trade-off analysis is analogous 
to that performed in the traditional Ao model. However, now programs will 
optimize for both S-KPP speed-to-capability and NR-KPP information-value-
delivery requirements.  
 
VAF focuses on demonstrated ability to bundle components.  “Bundle-ability” 
corresponds to how quickly and easily modular components can be assembled 
for new uses.  In that sense, “bundle-ability” is equivalent to “reusability.”  
Reusability is equivalent to build-time interoperability. Hence, S-KPP/NR-KPP-
based certification will document programs’ reuse of components, and the 
reusability of their newly developed components. The documentation will include 
description of specific value added to mission outcomes.   The process will 
populate an approved products list of reusable components.  Certifiers will help 
programs through the process by helping them to select appropriate open 
commercial standards and associated approved products. 
 
1 Over the last 20 years, the groups contributing to productive IT “standards” have broadened to include 
open source groups such as IETF, Linux, W3C, FSF, and commercial keiretsu such as OASIS, TOG, 
MISMO, RosettaNet, etc. Many of the most useful standards are now considered mere “recommendations” 
by their producers. Thus, the DoD must broaden its sense of standards to embrace emerging 
recommendations from important de facto standard setters. Even a monopolist such as Microsoft or a 
dominant player such as Oracle can impose de facto standards on the marketplace that the government 
should deliberately exploit.  
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IV. INFORMATION VALUE-BASED SUSTAINMENT KPP/NR-
KPP USE CASE  
Consider how VAF might support the following notional coalition counter-
insurgency mission thread.  Note that this example is over-simplified for clarity.  
 
US1 is a US National cell that performs Command and Control (C2) for 
US forces involved in coalition counter-insurgency operations.  
 
US1 receives ad hoc “tipper” information regarding the location of High-
Value Targets (HVT) over a TOP SECRET Internet Protocol (IP) network 
from the US-only surveillance and reconnaissance process.  This 
information is generally not actionable unless it is corroborated by an 
“authoritative source.”  
 
US1 subscribes to a ten-element intelligence report from Coalition 
Intelligence Processing Center (CIPC).  CIPC is an authoritative source of 
counter-insurgency intelligence.    
 
CIPC refreshes its intelligence report every hour and delivers it via a 
classified Coalition IP network. 
 
US1 typically takes 15 minutes to process the CIPC report.  
 
If the CIPC report corroborates the tipper information, US1 issues “kill” 
orders to US2 via a Classified US-only IP C2 network. US2 is a US 
National unit that performs targeting and weaponeering.   
 
US2 collects and shares information via various classified and unclassified 
tactical links, push-to-talk radios, and IP networks.  
 
US2 typically requires 15 minutes to prepare targeting artifacts, select best 
available weapons and platforms, and forward kill orders to selected 
coalition platforms.  
 
Coalition forces might need anywhere from a few minutes to an hour to 
engage the target.   
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Figure 3: “Information Value Availability” (Aiv) is a formulation of the NR-KPP that quantifies “semantic 
interoperability.” The objective of semantic interoperability across an enterprise is to enable powerful transactions 
among loosely coupled verticals.  In this example the “enterprise” is a military coalition. The “verticals” are various 
war fighting processes. Myriad communications circuits provide the loose coupling. Few, if any, of these circuits are 
shared across all the verticals.  Likewise, trust models vary with processes, participants, and situations.  Anr constrains 
evolving information architectures to selectively exchange and process the most critical data bits, decrease latency of 
critical information exchanges, and improve critical operational outcomes measurably.  
 
We apply the ten-step VAF process introduced in paragraph 2.c. above. 
 
1. Performance goal:  
 
The operational beta community seeks a 100% improvement (i.e., 2 
X) in Pk within 18 months, and 10% per year thereafter.  This 
requirement translates to a threshold Delivered Information Value 
(DIVT) value of:  
 
DIVT = 2 X PkBaseline 
 
 
2. Analyze as-is architecture:  
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Figure 4 sketches the notional mission thread transactional 
architecture.    
 
Figure 4: Hypothetical legacy architecture includes a collection of non-interoperable communications 
enclaves and non-integrated information processing activities.   Consumers must pull out the 
information they consider most critical from large volumes of data that is relatively crudely sorted.   
Cross-process collaboration in this enterprise often requires that a trusted broker “sneaker net” 
sanitized information from one proprietary communications circuit to another.   Hence, the 
enterprise lacks agility to routinely close critical transactions in time.   
 
The C2 process hypothetically initiates the mission thread when 
US1 receives a “tipper” about the location of an HVT from the 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance process.  Beta community 
experts explain that getting confirmation of the tipper information 
from an authoritative source is the most critical information 
exchange.  They confirm that in the as-is scenario US1 performs this 
confirmation by processing the intelligence summary they receive 
from CPIC.  
 
Recall that the CPIC prepares and delivers this summary message 
every hour.  US1 requires fifteen minutes to process the message 
and extract any corroborating information.  Therefore, total latency 
for this information exchange is from 15 to 75 min.  
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The hypothetical operational Beta community experience shows that 
tipper information is very perishable. HVTs normally re-locate within 
sixty minutes of reported sightings.   
 
On the other hand, (hypothetically) the tipper information, when 
corroborated, has proven to be very accurate.  Likewise, coalition 
weapons platforms have proven to be highly lethal.  
 
Given the existence of a corroborated tipper, its accuracy together 
with coalition force lethality, has proven Pk to be an almost linear 
function of detect-to-engage mission thread transactional latency 
information exchange time latency.    
 
Beta community experts estimate that detect-to-engage times of 10 
and 60 minutes would correspond to Pk of almost 100% and 10% 
respectively.    
 
These experts explain that their current baseline for Pk, given a 
corroborated tipper, is on the order of 10%.  Hence, we will assume 
baseline Pk = 10%.  
 
CPIC does not have authorization to receive the tipper information 
directly from the TOP SECRET US-ONLY network.  If it did, CPIC 
could immediately corroborate the tipper with its other sources.  
Operational experts explain that, although collected through TOP 
SECRET sources, the tipper information itself is so perishable that 
sharing it presents relatively little risk.   
 
The operational Beta development community explains that the US2 
targeting and weaponeering process uses operational 
reconnaissance assets such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to 
put “eyes-on-target” and calculate precise weapon delivery 
coordinates.  US2 communicates with UAVs over unclassified 
proprietary point-to-point links.   
 
US2 uses many tools and circuits, including Blue Force Tracker 
(BFT) via an unclassified commercial satellite link, to locate 
candidate weapons and delivery platforms.  Depending on which 
platforms and weapons it chooses -- e.g. Predator UAV and Hellfire 
missile, or SEAL Team and sniper rifle -- US2 uses a variety of 
communications paths to deliver a “9 line” targeting parameter 
message to the weapon delivery platform.   
 
 
3. Calculate baseline IPE:  
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Recall that IPE is in two parts, a “value ratio” and a perishability 
factor.   
 
IPE = VR x WP 
 
We calculate the value ratio for the CPIC-to-US1 corroboration 
information exchange as follows:  
 
VR = AB ÷ TB 
Where: 
 
VR = Value Ratio 
AB = Actionable Bits,  
TB = Total Bits Processed 
 
The information exchange associated with corroboration is a ten-
section message.  Only one of the sections contains exchanged 
message has actionable bits.  Therefore, approximately:  
 
VR = 1 ÷ 10 = 0.1 
 
Operators confirm that although they spend all of their time 
collecting and analyzing information, no more than 10% of that 
information turns out to be actionable.  The rest of the data they 
process either confirms their current understanding, adds to their 
general situational awareness, or is useless.  (Obviously this is a 
very crude example of how to calculate value-per-bit-processed. 
However, the VAF approach will quickly iterate empirically toward a 
pragmatically useful, empirical, measure. Therefore, it is not vital to 
start with a precise baseline index. It is vital that the operational 
customer community vouches for the value and utility of the 
approach.) 
 
Now we model WP as explained in paragraph 2.c. Based on 
hypothetical operational Beta community input above, set the 
objective value for information exchange latency at LO = 10 minutes 
and the threshold at LT = 60 minutes. Assign (WP)T = 0.1 to LT = 60 
minutes.  Calculate LT’ :  
 
(WP)T = 0.1 = (60 – LT’)/(60-50) 
 
LT’ = 55 min 
 
Now we can specify the weighting function as follows:  
 
WP  =1 if L ≤ 10 min; 
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WP = 0 if L > 60 min; 
WP = (60 - L)/50 if 10 min < L < 55 ; 
WP = .1 if 55 ≥ L ≤ 60 min 
 
Where:  
 
WP = Perishability weighting factor 
L = Information exchange latency  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: (Hypothetical) operators explain that given the existence of corroborated locating 
information for High Value Targets (HVT), Probability of Kill (Pk) depends almost exclusively on 
the latency (L) of the essential information exchanges.   They believe a Detect-to-Engage 
transactional latency of 10 minutes or less corresponds to an almost 100% Pk.  On the other hand, 
the HVTs tend not to stay in one location for more than an hour.  Hence latencies of greater than 60 
minutes correspond to Pk = 0.  
 
 
Per step #2, PkBaseline = 10%.  Per discussion in step 3 (above) 
Pk=10% corresponds to a value of WP of 0.1   
 
IPE = .1 x WP  
 
IPEBaseline = .1 x .1 = .01  
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4. Model dependency of operational performance to IPE:  
 
Pk = f(IPE) =  f(AB, L) such that Pk increases as: (a) Actionable 
Bits (AB) are available; and (b) Actionable Bits are exchanged and 
processed quickly. In other words Pk is strongly positively 
correlated to IPE as follows: 
 
Pk ≈ K x IPE 
Where: 
 
K = Proportionality function.  Using the baseline values calculated 
above we solve for K: 
 
PkBaseline  ≈ K X IPEBaseline 
 
.1 ≈  K X 0.01 
 
K ≈ 10 
 
 
Operators confirm that based on their experience it is reasonable to 
assume that Pk is linearly related to IPE. Therefore we assume 
initially that: 
Pk ≈ 10 X IPE 
 
5.Identify incremental IPE improvement goal:   
 
Per step 1, the threshold performance improvement goal is a 2 X 
improvement in PK.  Per step 2, PKBaseline = 10%.  Per step 4, Pk = 
10 X IPE.  Therefore the threshold IPE improvement goal (IPET) is: 
 
PkT = 2 X PkBaseline = 2 X .1 = .2 
 
IPET = PkT/10 = .2/10 = .02 
 
 
6.Calculate Aiv threshold value:  
 
(Aiv)T = IPET x DIVT 
 
Where: 
 
(Aiv)T = Threshold value of Information Value Availability 
IPET = Threshold value of Information Processing Efficiency 
DIVT = Threshold value of Delivered Information Value  
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Per step 1 the DIVT = 2 X PkBasline. Per step 2, PkBasline = 10%.  
Therefore:  
 
DIVT = 2 X 0.1 = 0.2 
 
Per step 5, IPET = 0.02.  Therefore: 
 
(Aiv)T = 0.2 X 0.02 = .004 
 
7. Analyze options and constraints.  Design solution architecture: 
 
The mission thread consists of four critical serial transactions.  
 
1. Exchange information to identify and confirm target 
location 
2. Exchange information to select weapons and platforms. 
3. Exchange information to launch attack.  
4. Deliver ordinance to kill target  
 
Operational effectiveness, i.e. Pk in this case, depends on the 
accuracy of the information exchanges in transactions 1-3, the 
lethality of the ordinance delivery in transaction 4, and the collective 
time it takes to close the 4 transactions.  In this case, accuracy and 
lethality are not issues.  The sole issue is transactional latency.  
Latency for exchanges 1-3 depends on IPE.   
 
Per figure 4, the as-is mission thread employs five semi-
autonomous processes and at least five different proprietary 
communications paths.  No communication path is common to all 
five processes.   
 
There is no shared trust model across the five processes.  
 
Per the discussion above, a solution architectural strategy is as 
follows:  
 
Requirement: Build as much capability as possible with 
COTS and GOTS components.  Continuously deploy 
incremental improvements.  A specific requirement is to 
develop GOTS sensor services for UAVs and other 
platforms. Work closely with the customer community.  
  
Solution: Employ SOA.  USE COTS SOA middleware.  Use  
COTS geospatial services.  Re-use GOTS “track” services 
(e.g. WEB COP.)  Develop GOTS UAV sensor service.  Use 
 29 
GOTS security services. Write procurement contract 
language to require lifecycle technology refresh, and Beta 
community feedback.  
 
Anr(t) = TD(i)/TCD(c) X WSC 
 
TCD(c) = TD(c)+ TT(c)+ Tc(c) 
 
TD = TI +TR + TB + TO  
 
Wsc = SC/(LOC/BLOC) = 1 per procurement requirement 
 
Anr = 12 mos / (6 + 0 + 4 + 2 + 3 + 3) mos   x 1 = .66 
 
 
Requirement: Provide common communication backplane.  
In this case, a specific requirement is for a routable network.  
 
Solution: Use commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
for shared UNCLAS Internet access.  Long-term target is 
“black core” Multi-Level Security (MLS) from UNCLAS to TS.  
 
Requirement:  Develop policy-based trust model.  In this 
case a specific requirement is to develop need-to-share 
policy and services to enable restricted tipper information to 
flow directly from surveillance and reconnaissance process 
to coalition intelligence analysis process.  
 
Solution: Employ Multiple Independent Layers of Security 
(MILS) architecture. Reuse pre-certified GOTS IA 
authorization and authentication service components.  Begin 
at UNCLAS level and then spiral toward multi-level security. 
Work with Beta-test community to invent dynamic need-to-
share and “unanticipated user” IA release policy.   
 
Requirement: Reduce “information overload”. Reduce the 
number of critical transactions per mission thread and close 
them more quickly.  A specific requirement, in this case, is to 
capture track information for both coalition weapon platforms 
and HVTs in machine-readable information exchange 
models (IEM).  The IEM must enable automated, policy-
based, weapon-target pairing and tasking.  
 
Solution: Reuse relevant target tracking information model 
components to describe and share target and weapon 
platform information.  Work with beta community to invent 
 30 
“Critical Conditions of Interest” VIRT information exchange 
requirement profiles to focus exchanges on HVT information 
components 
 
8. Rapidly deliver incremental improvement: 
 
For this mission thread example, assume the incremental 
improvement included: 
 
• UNCLAS Internet connectivity across the coalition 
• Dynamic need-to-share services 
• Alert service for the HVT scenario 
• Track service  
• UAV visual sensor services 
 
This type of development has previously proved successful. 
Specifically, the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 
(CWID) 08 Interoperability Trial (IT) 5.64 (see reference (f)) 
demonstrated a similar high assurance tactical SOA stack 
developed with GOTS and COTS components in twelve months.  
Their approach was as follows:  
 
• Base IT procurement in acquisition components that can 
reduce risk re cost, performance, and schedule 
 Exploit new GIG acquisition policies 
 Extend and expand pure COTS competition  
 Issue simple use cases in lieu of traditional RFI/RFP  
 Require mission context prototypes vice paper studies 
 Shorten delivery cycles and contract review periods 
 Exercise government purpose rights to software 
licenses 
• Incentivize PMs and COTS vendors to participate 
 Furnish pre-approved GOTS components 
 Streamline Certification and Accreditation (C&A) 
 Furnish V&V to put COTS on approved products list  
 
 
9. Test and certify against Aiv:  
 
In our hypothetical case, NR-KPP certifiers would solve for Aiv in 
the new solution architecture:    
 
(Aiv)T = IPET x DIVT 
 
Consultation with experts, campaign models, or other customer-
approved methods will return the new predicted value of Pk.  In this 
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case, Delivered Information Value (DIV) is exactly equivalent to Pk.  
If the new tested value of Pk does not meet or exceed NR-KPP 
threshold of PkT = 0.20, the system does not pass.  Note that once 
the first increment of new capability has been fielded, we can use 
the actual operationally audited value of Pk in future spirals.  For 
this example, arbitrarily assume: 
 
PkNew = 0.40 
 
 
Figure 6: Hypothetical to-be architecture includes an Internet “cloud” with web service stack.  
Mission authorities continuously revise policy per commander’s intent and emerging facts on the 
ground.  Sensor services provide real-time situational awareness.  High value targets (HVT) and 
Coalition weapon platforms are tracked with rich semantic models.  Pre-identified critical conditions 
of interest trigger emergency action tasking messages. Need-to-share services allow access based on 
pre-determined policy regarding identity, role, and emergent situation on the ground.  
 
 
Figure 6 describes the notional solution architecture outlined in step 
7.    If it this architecture is fielded as planned, we can calculate IPE 
as follows:  
 
IPE = AB ÷ TB x WP 
 
The only bits processed in this scenario are actionable – the alert 
service is designed to assure that.  So, AB = TB and AB ÷ TB = 1.  
The transactional latency budget in the solution architecture 
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includes 5 minutes for corroboration and from 1 to 60 minutes for 
mission preparation.   If we assume an average value of 30 minutes 
for mission preparation, the mean total transactional latency is L = 
35 minutes.  Entering the chart at Figure 5 with L = 35 returns WP = 
0.5.  So: 
 
IPE = 1 X 0.5 = 0.5   
 
Now we can solve for Aiv.  
 
Aiv = IPE x DIV = 0.5 x 0.4 = .0.2 
 
(Aiv)New = 0.20 > (Aiv)T = 0.004 
 
Because Aiv exceeds the  threshold value, NR-KPP certifiers accept 
the system and place the newly certified components on the 
approved products list. 
 
At this point we can re-evaluate the modeled relationship between 
IPE and Pk for the next iteration.   Previously we had modeled IPE 
as:   
 
IPE = K X Pk 
 
Our original estimate was that K = 10. Per discussion above:  
 
IPE = 0.5 = K X 0.4 
 
K = 0.5 ÷ 0.4 = 1.25 
 
Apparently, IPE, in the new architecture, is even more closely 
correlated with Pk than our original model suggested.  
 
Conceptually, given the order of magnitude improvement in Aiv, this 
notional solution architecture is very powerful.  However, cartoon 
drawings of “clouds and arrows” can do anything. It may not be 
realistic to field an operational realization of the cloud and arrows 
within the eighteen-month goal of this hypothetical development 
effort.  That said, fielding even a subset of the envisioned capability 
-- say the Internet backbone and a CONOPS-based need-to-share 
service -- might surpass the threshold NR-KPP requirements.  
 
Returning briefly to the previously mentioned CWID 08 IT 5.64 
demonstration. The analysis of that demonstration employed a test 
and certification model against a use case similar to the present 
example.  Findings showed 20% improvement in Probability of 
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Detection of the target of interest; 100% improvement in Detect to 
Engage time; 60-200% improvement in IPE as a result of VIRT and 
Need-to-Share services.    
 
 
10. Iterate: 
 
Repeat steps 1 – 9 with new target values for Aiv, IPE, and Pk. 
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